ARCh 1986 markcd thc cud of the phas out of interest rate ceilings on deposits, otherwise known as Regulation Q The handwriting on the wall became evident for Regulation 0, when the Monetary Contn'oi Act (MUA) of 1980 established the Depository Institutions Den'egulation Committee ID DC), whose main duty was to phase out the regulation over a period of six year's.
The purpose of this article is to review léderal policy on deposit interest rate ceilings over the 53 year's since they first were imposed. The article describes the objectives of Congress in establishing ceiling rates on deposits, examines their effects on the I'mnancial system and economic activity, and, finally, assesses the effect that phasing them out has had~n tile coniposition of deposit liabilities. This analysis focuses on three distinct periods dirt'-ing which Regulation 0, was administer-ed under different objectives. In the first period, 1933 through 1965, the ceilings constrained the interest r'ates paid by most commercial banks for only a few short intervals. During most of the second penod, 1966 through 1979, ceiling m'ates effectively constrained the t'ates paid by commercial banks and thrifts on at least some categories of their deposit liabilities. During the third period, 1980 through 1986, the DIDC gradually phased out Regulation (1 once again allowing market forces to determine deposit interest rates. 'i'he Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 prohibited the paynnent of interest on demand deposits and authorized the Fedentl Reserve to set intem'est t'ate ceilings on time and savings deposits paid by commercial banks. One important congn'essional mibjective was to encourage country banks to lend more in their local communities rather than hold balances with lar-ger banks in financial centers. Cm'itics of banking practices charged that the lan'ge banks in fimiancial center's used these funds for speculative purposes, thus depriving businesses and individuals in smaller communities of credit that could have been used productively.' Supporters of the pn'ohibition of inten'est on demand deposits also expressed concen'n that inten'hank hal-'The Banking Act of 1933 established controls over deposit interest rates tom commercial banks lhat were members of lhe Federal Reserve System. Nonmember commercial banks became subject to the same controls in the Banking Act of 1935. Mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations were exempt from the ceiling interest rates on deposits until the fall of 1966. Reasons for congressionally established interest rate ceilings in the 1930s ane discussed in Cox (1966) , pp. 1-30, House Committee on Banking and Currency (1 966a), pp. 651-53, Links (1966) , and Haywood and Linke (1968) . 
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ances were advemsely affecting the liquidity of the banking system. When smaller banks had an outflow of reserves, because of seasonal patterns in deposits and loan demand or occasional financial panics, they withdrew their deposits from their large correspondent banks in the financial centers.These withdrawals made it morn difficult for the large correspondents to meet the cash demands of their' nonbank customers. In its n'ole as lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve had been established in 1914 to deal with these liquidity problems. In the 1930s, however', Congress still believed that interbank balances created liquidity problems for the banking system.
Another objective of ceiling interest rates on deposits was to increase bank profits by limiting the competition for' deposits. Congm'ess felt that competition for' deposits not only reduced bank profits by n'aising imiterest expenses, but also might cause banks to acquin'e riskier' assets with higher' expected retui-ns in attempts to limit the erosion of their pn~ofits.2 Bank pm'otests about the cost of federal deposit insum-ance premiums provided a final justification for interest rate ceilings. Sotne members of Congr'ess believed that the savings in interest expense resulting from interest rate ceilings on deposits would exceed the deposit insurance premiums.
Some of the objectives mentioned above are based on the belief that banks' profits could be increased by imposing ceiling rates on deposits. l'he effects of these ceilings on bank profits are not as obvious as their effects on incentives to hold demand deposits. Figure 1 , which is used to illustrate the effects of ceiling rates on bank profits, depicts the supply and demand for loans and deposits in the banking system.
To simplily the presentation, the dollar amount of loans is assumed to equal the amount of deposits at each level of deposits? The solid line is the demand curve for loans from the banking system. The dashed line labeled D,r is the demand curve for deposits. The demand for deposits is based on the demand for loans. For each dollar amount of loans demanded, the interest rate that banks am willing to pay on deposits is somewhat less than the interest rate they can receive on loans; the difference determines bank profits. The banking system is assumed to be competitive. The profits are just large enough to yield a r'ate of r'eturn on the capital of the banking system comparable to returns on equity in other industries with similar risk. 4
The other dashed line, labeled S 4 , is the supply curve of deposits to banks; it indicates the interest rates that banks must pay to attract various dollar' amounts of deposits.
With no interest i-ate controls, banks will pay the interest rate OA on deposits and charge 01) on loans. Benston (1964) and Cox (1966) develop evidence from bank data for the 1920s and 1930s that is not consistent with the view that competition for deposits contributedto bank failures.
3 The capital of the banking system is assumed to equal the noninterest-bearing reserves of banks plus the value of their physical investmerlt in banking offices. Banks are assumed to maintain a constant ratio of capital to deposits. When deposits change, banks change their reserves and the value of their offices by the same percentage as the percentage change in their deposits. It deposits decline, banks reduce their loans by the same dollar amount and reduce capital by making a special dividend payment to their shareholders. If deposits rise, the shareholders make additional investments in the bank to raise capital. 4 The spread between the demand curve for loans and the demand curve for deposits is wider at higher levels of interest rates. This feature of the curves in figure 1 reflects the fact that the return on capital of the bank necessary to attract the investment of the bank's shareholders is higher when interest rates are higher. The level of deposits and loans will equal h),. The profits of the banking system equal ABCh). Suppose the government considem's these profits to be too small for a safe and sound banking system and sets a ceiling interest rate on the deposits of OE that is below the tate OA that banks would pay with no ceiling n-ate in effect. With that ceiling rate, the quantity of deposits that banks can attract falls to I),. With a lowem' level of deposits to lend, the interest i-ate on loans rises to OH. The profits of the banking system shift front ABCD to EFGLI.
Imposing the ceiling interest rate on deposits does not necessarily increase the pr-ofits of the banking system. The difference between prolits with the ceiling rate in effect and profits with no ceiling rate depends on the shapes of the demand curve for loans fD3 and the supply curve of deposits (5,,). Comigr'ess assumed implicitly that the slopes of these two curves wer'e sufficiently steel) that the banking system's profits would be higher with a ceiling rate on deposits One majom' reason thr inter'est ceilings on demand deposits was to reduce the incentives for relatively small banks lo hold deposits with larger banks in the major financial centers. Small commer'cial banks, however', did not reduce the share of their' assets held as deposits with other banks, but instead increased that share from about 5 percent in 1932 to about 17 percent by 1941 chart 1). As another indicator' of this 'A more thorough examination of the effects ol deposit rate ceilings on bank profits would incorporate the effects of non-interest competition. Profits would be reduced if banks respond to ceilings that restrain the interest rates they pay on deposits through non-interest expenditures. The implications of non-interest competition for deposits are considered in the section below that examines the effects of Regulation 0 policy in the period 1966 through 1979. On November 1, 1933, the Federal Reserve set the ceiling interest rate on all time and savings deposits at 3 percent (chart 2). The average interest rate that member banks paid on time deposits was 2.8 percent in 1932 and 2.6 percent in 1933. The ceiling rate of 3 percent, therefore, was above the rate that banks had been paying on time deposits shortly before it was imposed. tn 1934, the first full year for' member banks under Regulation Q the average interest rate paid by member banks on time deposits was 2.4 percent.
Thus, most member bank deposits did not yield the ceiling rate of 3 percent that year. 'I'he yield on shortterm Treasury securities was below 1 percent, while the yield on 4-to-fl month commercial paper was 1.25 percent in November 1933. Thus, this imtial ceiling rate on time and savings deposits was above both the rates being paid by member banks and short-term market rates.
'rhe ceiling rate on all time and savings deposits was lowered to 2.5 percent on Febr'uaty 1, 1935. The average interest rate paid by member banks on time deposits in 1935 was 1.9 percent, while most short-term market interest rates were under 1 percent. 
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Reserve interpreted its mandate for administering Regulation Q to restrain the especially aggressive banks from offering such high interest rates on deposits that they would get into financial trouble." It does not appear that the Federal Reserve pursued the policy, analyzed above, of attempting to increase the profits of the banking system by setting deposit ceiling rates below the rates that most banks would have paid with no ceilings in effect.
From the nud-1930s to the mid-1960s, the ceiling rates on time and savings deposits generally were above market interest rates and above the aver-age interest rates paid on time and savings deposits by member-banks. In 1957 and 1962, when market inteiest rates rose near' or' above the ceiling rates on savings deposits, these ceilings were raised (see chart 3 on page 29). Thus, for the first 30 or so years of their existence, ceiling interest rates on time and savings deposits were above interest rates on Treasury securities in all but a few months, and the average interest rates paid by member banks on all time and savings deposits were below the lowest ceiling rate in effect, the rate on savings deposits.
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Regulation Q policy was changed in 1966, when interest rate ceilings were imposed on thrift institutions (mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations). In contrast to the earlier period examined above, 1966 began a period of ceiling rates on at least some categories of time and savings deposits at commercial banks that were kept below Tr-easury bill rates.
The change in Regulation Q policy in 1966 reflected the dissatisfaction of policymakers with the performance of the financial system. Interest r'ates had rsen sham-ply in 1965 and 1966. The three-month Treasury bill rate had r-isen from 3.84 pem'cent in September1965 to 5.37 percent in September 1966. Over-that period, interest rates on residential mortgage loans had risen from 5.80 percent to 6.65 percent.
Pohicymakers became more and more comicemned about the allocation of credit. In 1966 the volume of funds n'aised by business fir'ms in the financial mar'kets rose sharply relative to the funds raised by households in the form of residential mortgages. The slowing in the rate of increase in residential mortgage credit was especially pronounced at thrift institutions?
The changes in Regulation Q ceiling r-ates metlected policymakers' interpretation of these events. Suppor'ters oflegislation that changed Regulation Qpolicy considered the conipetition for deposits between commer'cial banks and thrifts one of the primary causes of the general rise in interest rates. They amgued that deposit inter'est r-ate ceilings must be extended to thrifts to limit this rise.
Supporters of the legislation also thought that the diversion of credit from residential mor-tgages to credit for business firms could be rever'sed by limiting the interest rates that commercial banks could pay on deposits. Since commercial banks wer'e considered the thrifts' primary competitors in attm'acting deposits, thrifts could make mom-c mortgage credit available at lower interest rates if they were shielded from such competition.
In the fall of 1966, interest rate ceilings on deposits were set slightly higher at thrifts than at commercial banks. Higher ceiling rates at thrifts were intended to induce depositor's at commercial banks to shift their' deposit accounts to thrift institutions. Policymakers assumed that thrifts then would increase the amount of mortgage credit available to homebuyers and lower their-mortgage interest rates." 'This policy initially was described as a temporary one to deal with unusual circumstances. Over' time, however', many in the thrift institution industry came to view the new Regulation Q policy as essential for them to attr'act deposits and make mortgage loans."
Figur-e 2 illustr-ates the supply and demand for-deposits at commercial banks and thrift institutions. This analysis has two purposes: first, to model the effects of Regulation Q policy anticipated by policymakers, and second) to illustrate why this policy did not yield the anticipated results.
'See testimony in House Committee on Banking and Currency (196Gb) and Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (1966) . "Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks, which specialize in residential mortgage lending, are identified as thrift institutions. "For a statement by a govemment policymaker that defends Regulation 0 as a means of promoting the flow of credit to residential mortgages, see Martin (1970) . " Ruebling (1970) . 
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Some of the assumptions underlying figure 1 are also employed in constructing figure 2: For commercial banks and thrifts, deposits are assumed to equal loans. The spread between the demand curve for loans and that for deposits represents the competitive return on capital. To depositors, commercial banks and thrifts are close, but not perfect, substitutes. If, fijr instance, commercial banks increase the interest rate they offer on deposits relative to the rate offered by thrifts, some, but not all, depositors will shift their accounts from thrifts to commercial banks. This interaction is modeled in figure 2 by making the position of the supply curve for one kind of institution depend on the interest rate paid by the other kind. For instance, if commer'cial banks increase the interest rate they offer on deposits lr,,), the supply curve of deposits to thrifts will shift to the left.
Thrift institutions are assumed to specialize in mor-tgage lending, while commercial banks specialize in business and consumer lending. Given this specialization, the demand curve of loans from each type of institution is assumed to be independent of the interest rate that the other type of institution char-ges for loans.
Suppose, initially, that thrifts pay a slightly higher interest rate on deposits than commercial banks, i.e., that r~. exceeds r~, and the rate rẽquals the ceiling r-ate on deposits at comnmereial banks." In the initial equilibrium, the demand for loans at each type of institution is labeled D~and the demand for deposits is labeled D~the initial level of deposits and loans is~at commercial banks and T 0 at thrifts; and the initial mates charged on loans are c,, (banks) and m 0 (thr-ifts). Now, suppose that the demand for loans at both commercial banks and thrifts increases, m-epresented by shifts in the demand curves from lJ~to DL. The demand curves for deposits shift up to D~, maintaining the same spreads between the demand curves for loans and those for-deposits at each level of interest rates.
Policymaker's must either raise the ceiling rate on deposits at conimercial banks in response to the rise in the demand for credit or keep the ceiling rate at r~. contrast, policymakers decided to keep the ceiling rates at levels that would limit the rates that banks could pay on deposits and impose similar-ones on thrifts. The objectives of the new policy can be illustr'ated by comparing the effects of the increase in credit demand with and without the binding ceiling rates on deposits.
First, consider the case in which the ceiling r'ate is raised enough to place no constraint on the rates paid by commercial banks and no ceiling rate is imposed on thrifts. The effect of the increase in the demand for credit on the rates paid on deposits can be analyzed as a series of interactions between the rates paid by commercial banks and those paid by thrifts. With thrifts initially paying the rate ri on deposits, the rate paid by commercial banks rises to r,. With commercial banks paying the rate r~,the supply curve of deposits at thrifts shifts to the left (to S(r~)).The rise in the demand for loans at thrifts and the rise in the interest rate paid on deposits by commercial banks create an excess demand for deposits at thrifts. In response, the rate they offer to pay on deposits rises to r... The next step in the adjustment of deposit rates to the rise in the demand for credit involves a shift in the supply curve of deposits at commercial banks to the left (S(r4i), causing the rate paid by commercial banks to rise to r~.
Statements by the policymakers who advocated the change in Regulation Q policy in 1966 indicate that, after observing such interactions between the rates paid by commercial banks and thrifts, they concluded that interest rates were being driven higher by the competition. The increases in interest rates paid on deposits, in fact, represented the response by depository institutions to increases in the demand for credit.
The solution to the escalation of interest rates adopted by Congress was to impose ceilings on the deposit rates paid by thrifts and to set the ceiling rates for commercial banks and thrifts below the rates they would pay in the absence of ceilings. The ceiling rates were set slightly higher at thrifts to induce an inflow of deposits from commercial banks to thrifts, which would be used to make residential mortgage loans.
To illustrate how policymakers assumed this policy would work, sirppose the ceiling rate for commercial banks is rg and for thrifts is r-i~.Preventing an incr'ease in deposit interest rates at banks and thrifts is supposed to keep the supply curves for deposits in their initial positions before the rise in the demand for cr'edit (S(r-~)for-comnrnem-cial banks and S(r~(for thrifts). Imposing the ceiling rates rãnd r~. does pr'event a rise in the interest expense of depository institutions after the rise in the demand for credit. Figure 2 also illustrates, however, why the ceiling interest rates on deposits would not prevent increases in interest rates on loans charged by banks and thrifts. Suppose that after the rise in the demand for credit, the deposits and loans of banks are still B,, (yielding the ceiling rate r~) and the deposits and loans of thrifts are T 0 (yielding riJ. The interest rate charged by commercial banks on their commercial and consumer loans rises from c,, to c, due to the rise in the demand for credit; the interest i-ate charged by thrifts on mortgage loans rises from m 0 to m,.
It is not possible to draw a general conclusion about whether the mortgage interest rate would have been higher with no controls on the interest rates paid on deposits or with the ceiling rates rãnd rI in effect. The difference in the mortgage interest rate under these conditions depends on how responsive the supply of deposits at each type of institution is to the interest rate paid on deposits by the other type of institution." Additional influences on the supply of mortgage credit by thrift institutions analyzed in the following section, which policymakers seem to have ignored, would strengthen the argument that the Regulation Q policy adopted in 1966 reduced the supply of mortgage credit by thrifts and r-aised mortgage interest rates.
The change in Regulation Q policy in 1966 had the dual purpose of halting the escalation of interest rates paid on deposits and stimulating the expansion of mortgage credit. The fact that these objectives were inconsistent can be illustrated by referring again to figure 2. If the primary objective was to stimulate thrifts to make more mortgage loans, policymakers should have set the ceiling rate on bank deposits low enough to constrain the rate paid by banks, but should not have put ceilings on the inter-est rates paid by thrifts. With the ceiling r'ate on bank deposits of r, the deposits and loans of thrifts would have been higher (1',) and the interest rate on mortgage loans lower if thrifts had not been constrained by the ceiling rates on their deposits. "To illustrate the basis for this conclusion, suppose that the supply curve of deposits at thrifts does not shift when there is a change in the interest rate paid on deposits by commercial banks; instead, that supply curve remains in the initial position of S(rg). Under that assumption, the mortgage interest rate would be below m, with no ceiling interest rates on deposits after the rise in the demand for credit. In contrast, the farther the supply curve of deposits at thrifts shifts to the left for a given rise in the interest rate paid on deposits by commercial banks, the more likely it is that the mortgage rate would be higher under the condition of no interest rate controls on deposits.
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which is an annual series.
Ceiling rates on sonic categories of deposits were kept below the market rates oil Treasury securities formost of the period fr-om the fall of 1966 through Mar-ch 1986 (chart 3). This policy did not isolate thrift institutions and the nrar'ket for r-esidential mor-tgages from the effects of fluctuations iii mar'ket interest rates. When market interest rates rose relative to the ceiling rates, the growth of deposits at thrifts slowed." Flucluations in the growth of deposits at thrifts may have contributed to the abrupt changes in the pace of residential construction activrty; some studies, however, do not support the hypothesis that disintermediation at thm-ifts adversely affected residential construction. ' 3 Thus, the policy of imposing binding ceilings on deposit interest rates pr-oduced results that were inconsistent with the policy's stated goals.
There was ariother effect. Regulation Q policy altered the distribution of wealth in the economy. Deposit interest rate ceilings disci-irninated against the relatively less wealthy savers. ' 4 When market interest rates were above the ceiling rates, the wealthier inves- ' 3 Jaftee and Rosen (1979) and Berkman (1979) . The results of some studies, however, do not support the view that changes in the availability of mortgage credit through thrift institutions iniluence residential construction. See Arcelus and Mettzer (1973 ), Meltzer (1974 ), and De Rosa (1978 .
' 4 Kane (1970 Kane ( , 1980 , Clatfelter and Lieberman (1978) , and Lawrence and Eltiehausen (1981) . 'McKelvey (1978) . tors shifted their deposits to money market securities. Moreover, deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more were made exempt from Regulation Q in June 1970. Investors without enough funds to buy money market instruments continued to hold their funds at commercial banks and thrifts in accounts subject to Regulation Q ceiling rates. According to some studies, small savers lost several billion dollars in interest ear-mngs as a r-esult of Regulation Q ceilings.T he reasons for the failure of Regulation Q policy to achieve the objectives established in 1966 can be analyzed by examining figure 2. Setting the ceiling rate that banks could pay on deposits at rdid not guarantee that thrifts could attract deposits of T,, by paying the rate r~.Banks could attract additional deposits through various forms of non-interest expenditures. When interest rate ceilings on deposits were below the r-ates that banks would have offered with no ceilings in effect, banks competed for deposits by offering depositors a variety of gifts, free" services, and new offices that were more conveniently located.' These forms of non-interest competition shifted the supply curve of deposits at thrifts to the left of the line labeled S(r~). With the ceiling on thrift deposit rates at r' 1~, a shift in the supply curve of deposits to the left reduces the level of deposits and loans at thrifts and drives up the interest rate on mortgages. The various forms of noninterest competition for-deposits by thrifts would also cause the supply curve of deposits for banks to shift to the left.
Thus far, we have not indicated how inter-est r-ates other than those paid on the deposits of banks and thrifts influence the supply of deposits. When interest rates on securities such as Tr-easury bills rose above the ceiling rates on deposits at banks and thrifts, the growth of time and savings deposits declined at both types of institutions.' 7 This effect can be illustr'ated by referring to figure 2. Suppose the market interest rate on Treasury bills rises when the demand for credit rises at banks and thrifts. The rise in the Treasury bill rate shifts the supply curves of deposits to the left at both types of institutions. With ceiling rates rãnd rĩn effect, banks and thrifts can not respond directly by raising the interest rates they pay on deposits. As a ' 5 Morgan (1979) , Pyle (1974 Pyle ( , 1978 , and Taggart (1978) .
sWhite (1976) . Taggart (1978) , Speliman (1980) , Kilcollin and Hanweck (1981) , Peterson (1981) , and Startz (1983) . '~See Gilbert and Lovati (1979) . result, deposits at both banks arid thrifts fall and cause the inter-est r-ates on their loans to rise mor-e than if they had been free to raise the interest rates they pay on deposits.
The problems caused by interest rate ceilings became more serious in the late 1970s when market inter-est rates r'ose sharply (char-t 3) . In response, the regulators ofdepository institutions took limited steps to lift ceilings on some categories of time and savings deposits in denominations of $100,000 or-less.
The relaxation ofceiling interest rates on deposits in the late 1970s is shown in table 1. Money mar-ket certificates (MMCs), authorized in June 1978, had interest rate ceilings that floated with the yield on 6-month Treasury bills. Terms on MMCs incorporated two features of Regulation Q policy in effect befor-e June 1978: the ceiling rate for thr-ifts each week was 25 basis points higher than that at commercial banks, and, with a minimum denomination of $10,000, the authorization of MMCs benefited only wealthy investors.
Another change in 1978 was the authorization of automatic transfer service accounts at commer-cial banks, the fit-st move at the national level toward the authorrzation of interest-bearing checkable deposits. Finally, small saver certificates SSCs) were authorized in July 1979, with ceiling rates that floated with market interest rates; there was no minimum denonunation on SSCs but a minimum initial maturity of 30 months.
Sharp increases in interest rates in late 1979 and early 1980, combined with Regulation Q ceiling rates chart 3), induced large outflows of smalldenomination deposits from banks arid thrifts. Money market mutual ftrnds had become major competitors with depository institutions for small-denomination investment accounts, arid investments in money market mutual funds grew rapidly during 1979 arid ear-ly 1980 (chart 41. Realizing that Regulation Q was not yielding the desired results of restraining competition for deposits or-incr-easing the supply of mortgage cr-edit, Congress responded by passing the MCA in Marcli 1980, which established a procedure for phasing out Regulation Q.
One of the most significant sections of the MCA calls Adopted ru'es for the Al Savers Certiticates specrfied ri the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 November 1. 1981 Froating ceiting rates on MMGs each week changed to the higher of the 6-month Treasury bill rate in the previous week or the average over the previous four weeks. December 1, I 981
New category of IRA Keogh accounts created with rnnmmum maturity of 1 -t 2 ycars. rio regulated rnterest rate ceiing ano no minimum denomination. May 1, 1982 New tirrie deposit c'eateo with no interest rate ceikng. no niinimnum deriom~nationand an initial minimum maturity of 3-I.? years. New short-term deposit instrumn nt created with $7 aDO mrnimum deniominatorr arid 91 day m'itunty The floatrng ceiling rate :s equat to the discount yield on 91-day 1 reasury bills for S&Ls and MSBs. 25 basis points less for CBs Maturity r,inge of SS~s ad;usted to 30-42 months September 1 1982
Ncw deposit account created witri a minimum denomination of 520.000 and maturity of /to 31 days I he float.ng ceiling rate 's equal to the discount yield on 91 day Treasury bills ton SM s arid MSBs, 25 basis points less br CBs f tiese cong rates are susperrdeo mt the 91 thy Treasury bill rate fa'ls below 9 percent for tour cOnsecut,ve I reasury bnil auctions Decemhcr 14 1 g82
MMDAs authorized with niiriimum balance of not less than 52.500. no intcrest cening no minimum maturity, up to s'x transfers per month (rio more than three by craft), and unlimitecr wrthdrawais by mail. messenger or tn person January 5. 1983 Super NOW accounts authorized with same features as the MMDAs. except that unlimited tranisf mrs we permitted. Interest rate ceiling e:mminated and m nimum dennrriination reouced to $2,500 on 7-to 31-day ac:rournts Minimum denommnatinn reduced to 32 500 on 91-day accounts and MMCs of less than $100 000 Apr.i t . 1983
Mimurnurn maturity on SSCs reduced to 18 months October 1. 1983 All interest rate ceilings eliminated except those on pas~hooKsavings arid regular NOW accoLints Mir:imnUJm denorn:nation of 57.500 established or time deposits with maturities of 31 days or less (below thms minimum, oassbook sav-ngs rates apply) January 1. 1984 Hate diftureriniat between commercmal banks ana thrills on passbook savings accounts and / to 31 thy time deposits of less ftran $2,500 c'lrrninatc-d Ail depository .nstitctrons may pay a rnnaximum o5 50 percent January 1. 1981) Minimum denominations on MMDAs Super NOWs and 7-to 31 -oay ceiling free time dcposits reduced to $1 000 January 1. 1986 Minimum denominations on MMDAr. Super NOWs rrid 7-to 31-day cei'nq tree time deposits elimiriamed March 31. 1986 All interest rate ceilings ei:miriaten except or ttru requirerrient that no interest he paid on demand ouposits. for the elimination of ceilings on deposit interest rates return on theirsavings as soon as it is economically over a six-year period. The statement of findings and feasible for depositony institutions to pay such put-pose in that section of the act reads as follows:
The act did not establish a specific timetable for 'the Congress hereby finds that eliminating deposit interest c-ate ceilings, but dde- The act directed the DIDC to provide for the otderly phase-out of maximum interest r'ates that may be paid on time and savings deposits as rapidly as economic conditions wartarited. A primary consideration in deter-mining when conditions warranted raising or dimmating these ceilings was the effect of such changes on the safety and soundness of depository institutions. 'The act gave the DIDC broad discretion in choosing a method for phasing out the ceiling r-ates. an: qi binu (lrnnn)n Nan inber 1(782 Sonic of the early actions ofthe DtDC were explicitly dictated by Congress. These were the establishment of nationwide NOW accounts, available in Januaty 1981, and All Saver-s Certificates, available in Octobei 1981." Of the eam-ly changes made at the discr-etion of the DIIJC, the most significant involved raising or eliminating ceiling rates on categories of deposit liabilities with rather long maburities.'°Fon instance, the DtIJC's first action was to increase by 50 basis points the floating ceiling rates on time deposits with maturities of at least 30 months, effective in June 1980. Actions effective in August 1981 , December 1981 and May 1982 involved raising or elinunating ceiling rates on small time deposit accounts with initial maturities of 18 months or longer.
In contrast, there were relatively minor changes in the ceiling rates on short-term deposits. The only changes in the ceiling rates on MMCs, lot' instance, were the minor adjustments in June 1980 and November' 1981 (table 1) . The new categories of short-term ' 5 AIl Savers Certificates were a new category of deposits available at commercial banks and thrifts with a floating ceiling rate equal to 70 percent of the yield on one-year Treasury bills. Interest on these one-year certificates was exempt from federal income tax, up to $1,000 of interest per taxpayer. 20 The DIDC took other types of actions that are not listed in table 1.
Those other actions include restricting gifts by depository institutions to depositors and adjostiog the penalties for early withdrawal of deposits.
deposits authorized in May and September of 1982 had relatively high minimum denominations.
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Depository institutions complained to Congress that the DtDC was not moving fast enough to allow them to meet the competition from money market mutual funds (MMMF5). The categor-ies of short-term time deposits on which depository institutions could pay rates close to market interest rates had minimum denominations that were substantially higher than the minimum investments required by MMMFs. tnvestments in MMMFs continued growing much faster than small time arid savings deposits after the passage of the MCA in March 1980, a pattern that continued until late 1982 (chart 4).
The Garn-St Ger'main Act of 1982 directed the IJIDC to create a category of deposits with terms that would be directly equivalent to atid competitive with money market mutual funds." The DIDC i-esponded by authorizitig money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), available as of December 14, 1982, and Super NOW accounts, available as of January 5, 1983. The DIDC also specified a timetable for eliniinating the remaining ceiling r-ates, as indicated in table 1. MMDAs and Super NOW accounts were subject to minimum balance requirements until January 1, 1986. The only remaining i-estciction on the interest rates paid on deposits is the prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits, which was not altered by the MCA. epositor-s responded to the steps taken in phasing out Regulation Q by shif'ting their' funds to accounts on which they could receive higher returns. This is illustrated by the decline over-time in the m-atio of savings to small time deposits at all depository institutions, since the ceiling rates on small time deposits were raised and eliminated, while the ceilings on savings deposits changed little. In the thr-eeyears prior to the introduction of MMCs, 1975-77 , savings deposits were about 115 per-cent of small time deposits. That ratio has declined steadily since then, until, in 1985, savings deposits were only about 33 percent of small time deposits.
Pbnr-r-~-
Other' checkable deposits (the inten-est-bearing checkable deposits that institutions may offer to individuals and nonprofit institutions) began growing rapidly after all depository institutions were permitted to offer these accounts in January 1.981 (table 2) . The interest i-ate ceilings on other checkable deposits have been the same for commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and mutual savings banks since 1981. Commercial banks accounted for-oven' 81 percent of other-checkable deposits in 1981, but their share has declined by about 10 percentage points since then.
Commercial banks have increased their share of small time deposits since 1980 (table 3) . 'I'he rising share of small time deposits at commercial banks reflects the effect of sever-al DIDC actions that removed the advantages that the ceiling rates had given to thrift institutions in competing for small time deposits. For instance, thrifts lost their rate advantage on MMCs on June 5, 1980. Several other DIDC actions put thrifts and commercial banks on an equal footing in cornpeting for various categor'ies of small time deposits.
The ceiling rate on savings deposits was 25 basis points higher at thrift institutions than at commercial banks throughout the period covered in table 3 until January 1, 1984, when the ceiling at commercial banks was increased by 25 basis points. Despite the i-ate disadvantage, the share of savings deposits at commercial banks rose slightly in 1979 arid 1980. The relatively large drop in the share of savings deposits at commercial banks after-1982 appear's to be related to the success of commercial banks in attracting MMDAs. Since MMDAs were authorized in December 1982, the share at commercial banks has been around 60 percent or higher. Some of the funds that went into MMDAs at commercial banks carue out of their-own savings deposit liabilities.
Column 4 of table 3 nets out the trends in the first three columns. The share of small time and savings deposits plus MMDAS at commercial banks has risen steadily since 1979, the year before the DIDC began removing the rate ceiling advantages of thrift institutions. Half of these deposits were at commercial banks in 1985, up from about 40 percent in 1979.
Thrift institutions accounted for about 8 percent of the time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more in 1978. As their share of deposits in the smallerdenomination categories declined, thrifts turned to the market for large-denomination deposits to replace the small accounts they lost to commercial banks. By 1985, thrifts accounted for 36.5 percent of the lar'gedenomination deposits. pm jsits at cc so in ercial banks ha~bi -en smnal li-i-than he changes in the specific c;ttvgones. The share of total time amid savings deposits at commercial banks rose about 4 percentage points from 1978 through 1982 and has been approximately unchanged since then. Since 1982, the funds that thrifts have r-aised by incr-easing their large-denomination deposits have been sufficient to offset their declining share of smalldenomination deposits. The reasons for these changes are explained in the appendix.
The policy of setting interest i-ate ceilings on deposits did not achieve its intended objectives. The original objectives in the 1930s, when ceiling rates were first imposed on commercial banks, were to induce relatively small banks to reduce their balances due from other banks and to increase the profits of the banking system by limiting the interest expense of banks. Relatively small banks instead increased the share of their assets held at other-banks during the 1930s. During the first 30 years under Regulation Q ceiling rates on time and savings deposits were sufficiently high to put no effective constraint on the inter'est r-ates paid by most commercial banks. The ceiling rates, however, may have constr-ained the growth of the most aggressive banks.
Regulation Q policy adopted in 1966 failed to achieve its objectives of constraining increases in interest rates and promoting a stable supply of mon'tgage credit. As a side effect, the policy adopted in 1966 also alter-ed the allocation of wealth in the economy, causing those with r'elatively small savings to forego bilChanges in the share of total time and savings de- Congress acted in 1980 to establish a process for phasing out Regulation Qbecause it observed that the regulation was not producing the intended effects. Congress concluded that interest n-ate ceilings created problems for depository institutions, discriminated against small savers, and did not increase the supply of r'esidential mor-tgage credit. The committee established by Congress accelerated the process of phasing out Regulation Q in 1982 after Congress directed it to authorize deposit accounts that were "directly equivalent to and corupetitive with money market mutual funds."
The steps taken to phase out Regulation Q have altered the distribution of deposits between commercial banks and thrift institutions. Before 1980, ceiling interest rates were higher at thrift institutions on deposits in denominations less than $100,000. Thrifts lost this interest rate advantage as the ceiling n'ates wet-c lifted. The sban'e of small time and savings deposits at commercial banks rose from about 40 percent in 1979 to over 50 percent in 1985, as commercial banks were allowed to compete with thiift institutions for-these deposits on equal terms. 'l'hrift institutions have responded by increasing their' share of largedenomination time deposits. The distn-ibmrtion of total time and savings deposits between corumer-cial banks and thrift institutions has been essentially unchanged since 1982.
